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1. Introduction
The new Basel III framework contains a leverage ratio requirement, which has
been added to the earlier Basel II framework to supplement risk-based minimum
capital requirements for banks. According to the leverage ratio requirement,
banks must have a minimum of three percent of capital of non-risk-weighted
total assets, including o¤-balance sheet items (see Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision, 2009).1
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) argues that the lever-
age ratio requirement would “help contain the build up of excessive leverage in
the banking system, introduce additional safeguards against attempts to game
the risk based requirements, and help address model risk”. The global …nancial
crisis has indeed shown that many items on banks’ trading books and o¤-balance
sheet received very low risk-weights under Basel II but turned out to have sub-
stantial risk in the crisis (see e.g. Acharya et al., 2009). Such an outcome may
have been a manifestation both of “gaming” the risk-based capital requirements
by shifting assets from the banking book to the trading book or o¤-balance sheet,
and of “model risk” embedded in the theory-based risk-weights of Basel II. The
leverage ratio requirement would hence set an all-encompassing “‡oor” to min-
imum capital requirements, which would limit the potential erosive e¤ects of
gaming and model risk on capital against true risks.
The leverage ratio requirement has also been criticized for interfering with
the basic idea of risk-sensitive capital requirements, which is to align minimum
capital requirements with banks’ true asset risks and hence promote e¢cient
credit allocation. According to this argument, an additional leverage ratio re-
quirement would make the e¤ective capital requirement on low-risk assets too
high. This could lead to risk-shifting from low-risk to higher-risk assets which
could be a perverse outcome with an eye to the very aim of capital regulation
to safeguard …nancial stability.2
The purpose of this paper is to study the e¤ects of the combination of a
leverage ratio requirement and risk-based IRB (internal ratings based) capital
requirements, already introduced in Basel II, on loan pricing and loan allocation.
1 It might be more logical to talk about a capital to assets ratio requirement or an inverse
of a leverage ratio requirement. For simplicity, however, we henceforth use the term leverage
ratio requirement keeping in mind that it in actuality it is imposed in terms of a minimum
capital to assets ratio.
2A very di¤erent view is provided by Hellwig (2010) who argues for a leverage ratio require-
ment which would set banks’ capital at well beyond ten percent of non-risk-weighted total
assets; perhaps even to the 20 to 30 percent range. Such a leverage ratio requirement should
replace risk-based capital requirements which in themselves according to Hellwig (2010) spur
capital arbitrage which can further spur high leverage and excessive risk-taking by banks. A
su¢ciently high capital to assets ratio would in contrast provide a robust bu¤er against even
very high losses and promote good corporate governance in banks by raising the stake of bank
shareholders su¢ciently high. Hellwig’s (2010) view on limiting gaming the risk-based capital
requirements with the leverage ratio requirement appears to be in line with the view of the
Basel Committee (2009), but his policy conclusion regarding the level of the leverage ratio
requirement is much more extreme and categorical than the one currently opted for by the
Basel Committee.
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With the exception of Blum (2008), previous literature has not, to the best of
our knowledge, considered their joint e¤ect.3 We use the framework of Repullo
and Suarez (2004) who study the loan pricing and loan allocation e¤ects of the
Basel II reform. Basel II introduced two options to banks for determining their
capital requirements against loan assets: the IRB approach and the standard-
ized approach. In the case of unrated customers the latter option e¤ectively
reduces to a leverage ratio type of requirement. While in the analysis of Re-
pullo and Suarez (2004) banks choose which option to follow, in our version of
their model, motivated by Basel III, banks are simultaneously subject to both
the IRB requirement and a leverage ratio requirement.
We do not try to incorporate in our model any of the possible arguments for
rationalizing the leverage ratio requirement, discussed above. Analogously with
Repullo and Suarez (2004), who do not model any rationale for the regulator’s
o¤ering the two options to calculate minimum capital requirements, we take
it as given that banks face both the IRB requirement and the leverage ratio
requirement. In other words, our contribution is simply to look at how the
joint requirements a¤ect loan pricing and loan allocation across di¤erent risk
categories of loans. Following Repullo and Suarez (2004), the model is consistent
with the credit portfolio theory underlying the IRB capital requirements but is
highly stylized in the sense that only two loan categories, low-risk loans and
high-risk loans, are considered.4 Our key results comprise comparisons of loan
rates and amounts of low-risk and high-risk loans under Basel III with respect
to the benchmark of Basel II.5
As Repullo and Suarez (2004) state, when the IRB requirements are the only
capital requirements in the model, banks have an incentive to specialize in either
low-risk or high-risk lending. We introduce the leverage ratio requirement and
…nd three di¤erent cases (equilibria) of primary interest depending on where
the leverage ratio requirement is located in between the low-risk loan’s capital
requirement and the high-risk loan’s capital requirement.6 We only consider
3Blum (2008) presents a model in which a leverage ratio requirement can restore banks’
incentives to “truth-telling” in setting the internal ratings which form the basis for risk-
based capital requirements. This type of rationale might be generally used to motivate the
gaming and model risk based arguments for the leverage ratio requirement, stated by the
Basel Committee.
4Blum (2008) who does rationalize the additional leverage ratio requirement only considers
loans of one risk-type.
5We note that our results critically rely on the assumption that equity is a more expensive
form of …nance for banks than deposits which in the current model are the other source
of …nance for banks. This assumption is quite standard in the banking literature and the
reasons for the extra premium on banks’ equity are discussed e.g. by Repullo and Suarez
(2004). However, recently Hellwig (2010) and Admati et al. (2010) have analyzed the reasons
why this extra cost should not be exaggerated and why it is critical to make a clear distinction
between the private and social costs (or bene…ts) of bank capital. Nonetheless, as Admati et
al. (2010) point out, demand deposits can be understood as being part of a bank’s “production
function” and hence deposits, as opposed to equity, have a relative advantage as a form of
…nance for banks.
6 In addition, for some parameter speci…cations (but not, we believe, for the economically
most relevant ones), the model has an equilibrium in which all banks are still specialized to
low-risk or high-risk loans, and the only e¤ect of the leverage ratio requirement is to increase
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banks which under Basel II would have chosen the IRB approach to determine
their capital requirements. We believe this is the most relevant case in practice
because most of the large and sophisticated banks are likely to follow the IRB
approach, not least because of supervisory expectations to do so.7
We shall label the three possible types of equilibria A, B, and C. We prove
that, subject to plausible restrictions on the parameter values, one of the three
kinds of equilibria exists for each value of the leverage ratio requirement between
the capital requirements for the low-risk and high-risk loans. It turns out that
an equilibrium of type A exists when the leverage ratio requirement is above
but su¢ciently close to the low-risk loan’s capital requirement. Similarly, an
equilibrium of type C exists when the leverage ratio requirement is below but
su¢ciently close to the high-risk loan’s capital requirement, and there must also
be a range in the middle, in which an equilibrium of type B exists.
In equilibrium A, there are specialized high-risk loan banks just like in the
absence of the leverage ratio requirement, and also the high-risk interest rate
remains unchanged. However, the banks which under Basel II are specialized
in low-risk lending become now mixed portfolio banks.8 Given that high-risk
loans are pro…table to a bank, even when it is subject to a capital requirement
which is larger than the leverage ratio requirement, the low-risk loan bank will
cope with the leverage ratio requirement by including some high-risk loans in
its portfolio. In equilibrium, the interest rate on low-risk loans increases from
the Basel II world and hence reduces the demand for low-risk loans. However,
these changes can be expected to be small.
The equilibria of type B are symmetric equilibria in which all banks follow an
identical mixed portfolio strategy. We conjecture that these equilibria would in
the amount of capital of the specialized low-risk loan banks. This case is shortly considered
in Section 4.
There are also two obvious cases where the leverage ratio requirement is outside the interval
between the low-risk and the high-risk requirement. If the leverage ratio requirement is lower
than the low-risk loan’s capital requirement, then it is redundant in the context of the cur-
rent model and the loan market equilibrium is determined by the IRB capital requirements.
Similarly, if the leverage ratio requirement is above the high-risk loan’s capital requirement,
then it dominates and the loan market equilibrium is solely determined by the leverage ratio
requirement which in the current context corresponds to the type of equilibrium which ob-
tains under (the ‡at) capital requirements based on the Basel II’s standardized approach or
Basel I. This latter case could actually be used to analyze Hellwig’s (2010) suggestion that a
high leverage ratio requirement should replace risk-based capital requirements; see footnote 2
above.
7One idea in Basel II was an “evolutionary” approach to determining capital requirements
which apparently also involved moving from the standardized approach; if not immediately so
at least over time to the more sophisticated IRB approach. Incentives to this were provided by
calibrating the average capital requirement in the IRB approach lower than in the standardized
approach.
8 It should be observed that since both the original Repullo-Suarez model and the current
model describe games in which only a single round is played, one cannot strictly speaking
claim that in the model a bank would change its strategy when the leverage ratio requirement
is introduced. Nevertheless, one may intuitively think that, e.g. the mixed-portfolio banks
of equilibrium A have resulted from low-risk loan banks, which have included some high-risk
loans in their portfolio. We shall use this intuitive way of talking also in the discussion of
other equilibria below.
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a calibrated version of the model be possible only for a relatively narrow range
of values of the leverage ratio requirement. In an equilibrium of type B, interest
rates for high-risk loans are decreased and interest rates for low-risk loans are
increased, whereas the demands for the two types of loans move in the opposite
direction.
In case C, the leverage ratio requirement is below but relatively close to
the high-risk capital requirement. In this equilibrium there are banks which
specialize in low-risk lending. As a result, the low-risk interest rate raises to the
level which corresponds to the leverage ratio requirement (rather than the Basel
II capital requirement for low-risk loans). Given this increased interest rate, it
turns out to be pro…table for a high-risk loan bank to include some low-risk
loans in its portfolio. This possibility to increase pro…ts leads to a reduction of
the interest rate for high-risk loans because the banking sector is competitive.
As a result, the demand for low-risk loans is smaller and the demand for high-
risk loans is larger than in the Basel II world. It turns out that the demand
for high-risk loans obtains its largest value just on the border of cases B and C.
To summarize our main results, cases A and B are probably the most rele-
vant in practice, given the current plan of having a three-percent leverage ratio
requirement under Basel III. Hence we may conjecture that the introduction of
the leverage ratio requirement could reduce low-risk lending, although if case
A prevails, the e¤ect is probably quite small.9 Further, if case B or C should
prevail, the leverage ratio requirement could lead to an increase in high-risk
lending.
As we have not pursued a welfare analysis in the current version of the paper,
we cannot make any statements about the social optimality of the above ana-
lyzed shifts in lending. We may only speculate, perhaps for reasons outside our
model, that if less low-risk lending and more high-risk lending are undesirable
from the viewpoint of …nancial stability, then the allocational e¤ects of adding
the leverage ratio requirement appear counter-productive. Hence the alloca-
tional e¤ects may pose a trade-o¤ against the alleged positive …nancial stability
e¤ects of the leverage ratio requirement, envisaged in the Basel III reform.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We …rst recapitulate the main
features of the Repullo-Suarez (2004) model in Section 2, and in Section 3 we
discuss the e¤ects of a leverage ratio requirement in the context of the model in
general terms. In the subsequent four sections, we discuss the di¤erent kinds of
equilibria of the model. Section 8 concludes.
2. The Logical Structure of the Model
In the Repullo-Suarez (2004) model there is a banking sector which …nances
two kinds of …rms, which we label low-risk (L) …rms and high-risk (H) …rms.
9There is some evidence that parts of the …nancial industry, e.g. municipality …nance
in Europe, have been concerned about the e¤ects of the leverage ratio requirement on their
low-risk lending.
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Both kinds of …rms need investments of the same size ¹R for their projects, to
which we shall refer as low-risk and high-risk projects. The portfolio of a bank
may be characterized by naming the share of the high-risk projects among all
the projects that it …nances, and below we shall say that a bank has portfolio
® when this share is ®:
Each bank …nances the loans that it grants partially by capital and partially
by deposits. The amount of capital per loan that the bank owns will below
be denoted by k. The interest rate on deposits will be normalized to zero.
The capital of the banks would earn the riskless interest rate ± elsewhere in
the economy. The banking sector is competitive in the sense that the expected
pro…ts of the banks are zero.
The banks are subject to a risk-based capital requirement which states that
a part b´ of each loan of the category ´ (´ = L;H) must be funded by capital.
Since we are considering loans of size ¹R, this means that the capital requirement
kL for low-risk loans is kL = bL ¹R, and the capital requirement kH for high-risk
loans is kH = bH ¹R. Denoting the amount of capital that the bank owns per
loan by k, the capital requirement of a bank of a unit size with portfolio ® may
be formulated as
k ¸ · (®) (1)
where
· (®) = (1 ¡ ®) kL + ®kH = ((1 ¡ ®) bL + ®bH) ¹R (2)
The demand n´ for loans of each category ´ (´ = L;H) is identical with the
number of the …rms of category ´ which choose to make an investment, and it
is a decreasing function of the interest rate r´ for the loans of category ´. In
other words,
@
@r´
n´ (r´) < 0 (3)
The projects chosen by the …rms can either succeed of fail. If a …rm succeeds
in a project of type ´, it will give the bank the sum (1 + r´) ¹R (i.e. principal
plus interest) as a repayment for the loan. If a …rm fails, it will default. In this
case, the bank will get only (1 ¡ ¸) ¹R as a repayment for the loan. Here the
parameter ¸ characterizes the loss given default of the bank.
The success probability of the project of a …rm i is characterized the random
variable i which is de…ned by
xi = ¹i +
p
½z +
p
1 ¡ ½"i (4)
and the project defaults if xi > 0. Here z » N (0; 1) is the systematic risk factor,
and the random variables "i » N (0; 1) are independent of each other and of z.
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The value of ¹i is equal with the constant ¹L for low-risk projects, and with
the constant ¹H for the high-risk projects.
Clearly, the unconditional default probability p´ of the projects of type ´
(´ = L;H) is given by
p´ = ©
¡
¹´
¢
(5)
Consider now the success probabilities of the projects when the systematic risk
factor z has been realized. The above assumptions imply that for a given value
of z the default probability p´ of a project i of type ´ (´ = L;H) is
p´ (z) = P
¡
¹´ +
p
½z +
p
1 ¡ ½"i > 0
¢
This is equivalent with
p´ (z) = P
µ
"i > ¡
¹´ +
p
½zp
1 ¡ ½
¶
= ©
µ
¹´ +
p
½zp
1 ¡ ½
¶
(6)
The repayment that a bank with the portfolio ® receives per loan for a given
value of z is given by
(1 ¡ ®) ¡(1 ¡ pL (z)) (1 + rL) ¹R+ pL (z) (1 ¡ ¸) ¹R¢
+®
¡
(1 ¡ pH (z)) (1 + rH) ¹R+ pH (z) (1 ¡ ¸) ¹R
¢
= ¹R + ½ (®; rL; rH ; z) ¹R
where the function
½ (®; rL; rH ; z) = (1 ¡ ®) (rL ¡ pL (z) (¸ + rL)) + ® (rH ¡ pH (z) (¸ + rH)) (7)
may be viewed as a measure of the average interest rate that the bank earns for
its loans.
When the amount of capital that the bank has per loan has the value k, the
average pro…t that the bank earns per loan is given by
¹R+ ½ (®; rL; rH ; z) ¹R¡
¡
¹R¡ k¢
i.e. by
¼ (k;®; rL; rH ; z) = k + ½ (®; rL; rH ; z) ¹R (8)
Following Repullo-Suarez (2004), we shall formulate the equilibrium condi-
tions of the model for a bank of a unit size. The expected pro…t of bank of a
unit size with the capital k and with the portfolio ® is, in general,
¦(k;®; rL; rH) =
Z bz®
¡1
¼ (k;®; rL; rH ; z) d©(z) (9)
where bz® is the value of z for which integrand becomes zero. Intuitively, if
z > bz®, the losses of the bank are larger than the invested capital, and the bank
will go bankrupt and yield a zero pro…t (rather than a negative pro…t) for its
owners.
Given that the interest rate for bank capital is ±, the expected value of the
considered bank is
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V (k; ®; rL; rH) = ¡k + 1
1 + ±
¦(k; ®; rL; rH) (10)
Since the banking sector is competitive, the equilibrium conditions of the model
state that the value of V must be zero for each of the choices of k and ® that
banks make. In addition, in equilibrium there cannot be any other legitimate
choices of k and ® that would yield a positive pro…t.
In the Repullo-Suarez model, each bank will specialize in either low-risk or
high-risk loans. Repullo and Suarez also demonstrate (ibid., p. 502) that it is
optimal for the banks to choose the minimum amount of capital which is allowed
by the capital requirement (which is kL in the case of a low-risk loan bank, and
kH in the case of a high-risk loan bank).
As we shall shortly see, the specialized banks are important for the analysis
of most of the equilibria that we investigate in the next section. Accordingly,
it will turn out to be handy to have notations also for the functions which
correspond to the functions ½, ¼, ¦, and V in the case in which a bank has
only loans of single type ´ (´ = L;H) in its portfolio. The de…nitions of such
functions can be obtained from the de…nitions (7), (8), (9), and (10) by putting
® = 0 and ® = 1. We de…ne the function ½´, which expresses the average
interest rate earned by a bank of type ´ (´ = L;H) as
½´ (r´ ; z) = r´ ¡ p´ (z) (¸+ r´) (11)
and the function ¼´ , which expresses the average pro…t that the bank earns per
loan for a given value of z (when its amount of capital per loan is k) by
¼´ (k; r´; z) = k + ½´ (r´; z) ¹R (12)
The expected pro…t of bank of a unit size with the capital k and with only loans
of type ´ (´ = L;H) in its portfolio is given by
¦´ (k; r´) =
Z bz´
¡1
¼´ (k; r´; z) d©(z) (13)
where bz´ is the value of z for which integrand becomes zero and the bank earns
zero pro…ts, and the expected value of the considered bank is
V´ (k; r´) = ¡k + 1
1 + ±
¦´ (k; r´) (14)
The equilibrium conditions of the Repullo-Suarez model may now be formu-
lated by stating that the value of the functions VL and VH is zero when the
low-risk loan banks and the high-risk loan banks choose the smallest legimate
amount of capital. These conditions determine the equilibrium interest rates in
the absence of a leverage ratio requirement. We shall denote these interest rates
by ¹rL and ¹rH . In other words, the interest rates ¹rL and ¹rH are determined by
the equilibrium conditions
8
½
VL (kL; ¹rL) = 0
VH (kH ; ¹rH) = 0
(15)
We also introduce the notations ¹nL and ¹nH for the demand for low-risk and
high-risk loans in the absence of the leverage ratio requirement. In other words,
¹n´ (where ´ = L;H) is given by
¹n´ = n´ (¹r´) (16)
3. Introducing a Leverage Ratio Requirement
We now consider the e¤ects of introducing a leverage ratio requirement to the
considered economy. More speci…cally, we postulate that in addition to (2) the
banks are also subject to the requirement which states that a part b of each
loan (independently of its type) must be funded by capital. Remembering that
k refers to the amount of capital that a bank has ber loan, this requirement can
in the context of our model be formulated as
k ¸ b ¹R (17)
and, putting klev = b ¹R, the requirement that applies to a bank of a unit size
with portfolio ® may be formulated as
k ¸ maxf· (®) ; klevg (18)
In what follows we shall view kL and kH , where kL < kH , as given and
consider the nature of the equibrium for di¤erent values of klev. Trivially, the
equilibrium will not be a¤ected by the leverage ratio requirement if klev ·
kL, and if klev ¸ kH , the equilibrium will correspond to a constant capital
requirement of size klev, so that in this case the analysis of Repullo and Suarez
is applicable as such if one puts kL = kH = klev in it. The next three subsections
will be considered with the non-trivial case in which kL < klev < kH .
In this case there is a value of the share ® of high-risk projects, whih turns
both the leverage ratio requirement and the risk-based capital requirements into
binding constraints when the bank chooses the smallest legitimate amount of
capital. This will be the case for the portfolio ®lev which satis…es the condition
klev = (1 ¡ ®lev) kL + ®levkH (19)
This condition is equivalent with
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®lev =
klev ¡ kL
kH ¡ kL (20)
Clearly, when ® < ®lev, the amount of capital which is required by the leverage
ratio requirement is larger than the amount of capital required by the risk-based
requirement, but the opposite is the case when ® > ®lev.
As we just stated, Repullo-Suarez (2004) point out that in the currently
considered model each bank chooses the smallest allowed amount of capital. In
our setting this can be proved by concluding from (10), (9), and (8) that
@
@kV (k;®; rL; rH) = @
³
¡k + 1
1+±¦(k; ®; rL; rH)
´
= ¡1 + 11+±
R bz®
¡1 d©(z) < ¡1 + 11+± < 0
Hence, for each portfolio ®, it is in the interest of the banks to have the minimum
amount of capital allowed by the capital requirements.
Repullo and Suarez’s conclusion that under the Basel II regime banks will
specialize in either high-risk or low-risk loans is based on a lemma (ibid., p. 503
and p. 519) which states that the value of a mixed-portfolio bank can never be
larger than the value of both a low-risk loan bank and a high-risk loan bank of
the same size, and that the value of the mixed-portfolio bank is almost always
smaller, with the exception of a very special choice of parameter values.10 This
result is not, as such applicable to our more general setting, because in our
model the banks are not subject to a capital requirement of the form (1), but
rather of the form (18). In the current setting it turns out to be useful to
formulate a somewhat stronger version of Repullo and Suarez’s lemma. This
version states, intuitively, that if the banks are subject to a risk-based capital
requirement and the portfolios ®1 and ®3 (where ®1 < ®3) do not correspond
to banks with a positive value, none of the portfolios between them (i.e. none
of the portfolios ®2 for which ®1 < ®2 < ®3) can do any better (i.e., also their
value is zero or negative). The following lemma is even more general.
Lemma 1. Consider banks which are subject to a risk-based capital re-
quirement which states that each bank should have …nance the part k´ of each
loan of type ´ (´ = L;H) with capital, and suppose that kL · kH . Consider
banks with portfolios ®1, ®2, and ®3, where 0 · ®1 < ®2 < ®3 · 1. The value
of a bank with portfolio ®2 is less than or equal with a weighted average of the
values of the banks with portfolios ®1 and ®3,
V (· (®2) ; ®2; rL; rH) · ¯V (· (®1) ; ®1; rL; rH)+(1 ¡ ¯)V (· (®3) ; ®3; rL; rH)
where ¯ is given by
¯ = ®3¡®2®3¡®1
Lemma 1 simpli…es our analysis essentially, because it decreases the number
of the portfolios that we must consider. Consider …rst a portfolio ® for which
10 It should be observed that the value of the mixed portfolio bank is not necessarily smaller
if the number bz which appears in (6) in Repullo-Suarez (2004), 502, is identical for the low-risk
loan bank and the high-risk loan bank.
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®lev < ® < 1, and assume that some banks had this portfolio in equilibrium. In
this case it would have to be the case that
V (· (®) ; ®; rL; rH) = 0
Since the capital requirement which applies to each of the portfolios is ®lev,
®, 1 is equal with the risk based capital requirement which is given by the
function ·, we may now apply Lemma 1 to the portfolios ®1 = ®lev, ®2 = ®,
and ®3 = 1. Since there can be no banks with a positive value in equilibrium, we
may conclude from Lemma 1 that a high-risk loan bank and bank with portfolio
®lev must also be of zero value in the considered case, and that this is possible
only in the very special case in which the condition in Lemma 1 is valid with
identity. In this special case the model must have also another equilibrium, in
which there are no banks with portfolio ®, and in which their loans are owned
high-risk loan banks and banks with portfolio ®lev.11
The above argument justi…es our practice of not considering portfolios ®
between ®lev and 1. The practice of not considering portfolios between 0 and
®lev may be justi…ed similarly, making use of an analogous lemma which applies
to banks that are subject to a constant capital requirement.
Lemma 2. Consider banks which are subject to a constant capital require-
ment which states that each bank should have …nance the part klev of each of
its loan with capital and consider banks with portfolios ®1, ®2, and ®3, where
0 · ®1 < ®2 < ®3 · 1. The value of a bank with portfolio ®2 is less than or
equal with a weighted average of the values of the banks with portfolios ®1 and
®3,
V (klev; ®2; rL; rH) · ¯V (klev; ®1; rL; rH) + (1 ¡ ¯)V (klev; ®3; rL; rH)
where ¯ is given by
¯ = ®3¡®2®3¡®1
One may conclude from Lemma 2 that if an equilibrium with banks with
portfolio ® existed, in this equilibrium the value of the banks with portfolios 0
and ®lev would have to be zero, and there would be an equilibrium in which the
banks with portfolio ® were replaced by banks with portfolios 0 and ®lev .12
11More rigorously, if the model has an equilibrium (call it equilibrium E1) in which m loans
are owned by banks with portfolio ®, these banks must own (1¡ ®)m low-risk loans and
®m high-risk loans. In this case one may conclude from Lemma 1 that the model must have
another equilibrium which is similar with equilibrium E1 except for the following di¤erences:
1) There are no banks with with portfolio ®.
2) In addition to the banks which exist in equilibrium E1, there are also
((1¡ ®) = (1 ¡ ®lev))m banks of unit size with portfolio ®lev , and ®m ¡
(1 ¡ ®) (®lev= (1¡ ®lev))m high-risk banks.
This is because the banks mentioned in 2) above supply the same loans with the banks with
portfolio ®, and according to Lemma 1, also these banks must be of zero value.
12More rigorously, if 0 < ® < ®lev and the model has an equilibrium (call it equilibrium
E2) in which m loans are owned by banks with portfolio ®, it must once more be the case
that these banks own (1 ¡ ®)m low-risk loans and ®m high-risk loans. This time one may
conclude from Lemma 2 that the model must have another equilibrium which is similar with
equilibrium E2 except for the following di¤erences:
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On the basis of these considerations, we may from now on restrict attention
to just three possible portfolios in our analysis. These are the portfolios 0, ®lev,
and 1, i.e. a portfolio which consists of only low-risk loans (and for which the
only binding constraint is the leverage ratio requirement), the portfolio for which
both constraints are binding, and the portfolio which consists of only high-risk
loans (and for which the only binding constraint is the risk-based requirement).
For short, we shall refer to these banks as low-risk loan banks, mixed portfolio
banks, and high-risk loan banks, respectively.
If an equilibrium contains specialized high-risk loan banks, the equilibrium
condition
VH (kH ; rH) = 0
must be valid for them, implying that the high-risk interest rate must have its
Basel II value rH = ¹rH , which appears in (15). On the other hand, the capital
requirement which applies to the specialized low-risk banks is the leverage ratio
requirement klev . We shall denote the low-risk interest rate with which such
banks are faced in equilibrium by rL;lev. In other words, the interest rate rL;lev
is characterized by the equilibrium condition
VL (klev; rL;lev) = 0 (21)
The equilibrium condition which applies to a bank with the portfolio ®lev is
V (klev; ®lev; rL; rH) = 0 (22)
The equilibrium condition (22) di¤ers from the conditions (15) and (21) in so
far that by itself it does not su¢ce to determine either of the interest rates rL
and rH . Rather, it su¢ces only for determining rL as a function of rH , and
vice versa. Below we shall repeatedly make use of this fact in our analysis, and
for this reason we introduce the notation rL;E (rH ; klev; ®lev) for the value of
rL which satis…es (22) for given values of rH ; klev; and ®lev, and the notation
rH;E (rL; klev; ®lev) for the value of rH which satis…es (22) for given values of
rL; klev; and ®lev. In other words, the functions rL;E and rH;E are characterized
by the conditions
V (k;®; rL;E (rH ; k; ®) ; rH) = 0 (23)
and
V (k; ®; rL; rH;E (rL; k; ®)) = 0 (24)
It is clear from the de…nitions (7)-(10) that rL;E (rH ; k; ®) and rH;E (rL; k; ®)
are decreasing functions of rH and rL.
1) There are no banks with with portfolio ®.
2) In addition to the banks which exist in equilibrium E2, there are also (®=®lev)m banks
of unit size with portfolio ®lev, and (1 ¡ ®)m¡ (1 ¡ ®lev) (®=®lev)m low-risk banks.
Again, this is because the banks mentioned in 2) above supply the same loans with the
banks with portfolio ®, and they must be of zero value according to Lemma 2.
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4. The Equilibrium with Specialized Banks
In the current version of our paper, we shall not present a detailed analysis of
the equilibria in which the specialized low-risk loan banks and the specialized
high-risk banks co-exist. The aim of the current section is to motivate this
omission.
If an equilibrium contains both low-risk loan banks and high-risk loan banks,
the high-risk interest rate must have the value ¹rH that it would have also in the
absence of the leverage ratio requirement, and the low-risk interest rate must
have the value rL;lev that corresponds to a constant capital requirement of size
klev. Intuitively, if rL = rL;lev and rH = ¹rH , the low-risk loan banks react
to the leverage requirement by increasing their amount of capital to the level
required by it, but the business model of the high-risk banks is not a¤ected by
the leverage ratio requirement.
However, in this case a low-risk loan bank has also another obvious way of
coping with the leverage ratio requirement. It might include high-risk loans
in its portfolio to such an extent that the leverage ratio requirement becomes
valid also when the bank has only the amount of capital which corresponds
to the Basel II requirement (i.e., kL for each low-risk loan, and kH for each
high-risk loan). The latter strategy decreases the expected value of the bank,
even when a high-risk loan bank with capital kH per loan has zero (rather than
negative) expected value, because of the possibility that high-risk loan banks go
bankrupt when low-risk loan banks do not, or vice versa. When this happens, a
mixed portfolio bank will have to use some of the pro…ts that it earns from low-
risk loans for covering the losses from high-risk loans (or vice versa), but this
situation is not possible when the loans have been granted by specialized banks.
A low-risk bank will prefer the strategy of becoming a mixed-portfolio bank to
the strategy of increasing the level of capital and staying specialized whenever
the expected loss from the shifts in bankruptcy probabilities are smaller than
the losses from extra capital, but not otherwise.
The risk-based Basel II capital requirements have been chosen so that the
probability of bankruptcy is small (at most 0.001) for each of the considered
portfolios. Hence, for realistically calibrated parameter values the negative ef-
fects of having a mixed porfolio may be expected to be small. More speci…cally,
the failure probabilities of low-risk loan banks and high-risk loan banks under
the Basel II regime are (using the notation of (13)) given by 1 ¡ ©(bzL) and
1¡©(bzH), and if these numbers are close to each other, also the e¤ects that the
di¤erent failure probabilities of low-risk and high-risk banks have on bank value
must according to (13) and (14) be small. Our analysis will be based on the
assumption that such e¤ects are su¢ciently small to make the mixed portfolio
strategy preferable to the strategy of sticking to a low-risk pro…le, and paying
the costs of extra capital.
In the current paper, we shall not present a general answer to the question
when the di¤erence between ©(bzL) and ©(bzH) is su¢ciently small to make
it impossible for the specialized low-risk loan and high-risk loan banks to co-
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exist. Rather, we shall rest content with presenting su¢cient (but by no means
necessary) conditions for eliminating this possibility.
The next section is concerned with an equilibrium in which the high-risk
interest rate does not adjust, and the low-risk loans are o¤ered by mixed port-
folio banks. It turns out that the mixed-portfolio strategy of this equilibrium is
preferable to the strategy of specializing in low-risk loans whenever
maxf1 ¡ ©(bzL) ; 1 ¡ ©(bzH)g < ± (1 ¡ ¹®)min½bH ¡ bL¸¡ bH ; bH ¡ bLbH + rH
¾
(25)
Here ¹® is the share of high-risk loans among all granted loans (rather than in
the portfolio of some particular bank).
Similarly, Section 7 will be concerned with an equlibrium in which there are
low-risk loan banks and mixed portfolio banks. It turns out that for the interest
rates that occur in this equilibrium, the strategy of being a mixed-portfolio bank
is preferable to the strategy of being a specialized high-risk bank whenever
maxf1 ¡ ©(bzL) ; 1 ¡ ©(bzH)g < ±¹®2 bH ¡ bLbH + rH (26)
5. The Equilibrium with Mixed-portfolio Banks
and High-risk Banks
The easiest way to understand intuitively the equilibrium that we consider next
is, perhaps, to consider the case in which the leverage ratio requirement is quite
close to kL. Intuitively, one may think that in this case the the leverage ratio
requirement is irrelevant for the business model of the high-risk loan bank,
and if the high-risk loan banks stick to …nancing high-risk loans only, also the
high-risk interest rate rH must retain the value ¹rH which it would have in the
absence of the leverage ratio requirement. Given that the high-risk loan banks
are of zero (rather than negative) value, although they are subject to a higher
capital requirement than the low-risk loan banks, the low-risk loan banks react
to the leverage ratio requirement by becoming mixed-portfolio banks and adding
high-risk projects to their portfolio until the risk-based requirement becomes a
binding constraint for them.13
When rH = ¹rH has been given, the low-risk interest rate rL is determined
by the condition (22), according to which the value of the mixed-portfolio bank
must be zero. In other words, the interest rates rL and rH are determined by
the equilibrium conditions½
V (klev ; ®lev; rL; rH) = 0
VH (kH ; rH) = 0
(27)
13Cf. footnote 8 above.
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Using the notations introduced in (15) and (23), the interest rates which solve
these equilibrium conditions are given by½
rL = rL;E (¹rH ; klev; ®lev)
rH = ¹rH
(28)
Given these interest rates, the two kinds of banks (i.e. the mixed-portfolio
banks, and the high-risk loan banks) will be able to follow the strategies that
we just described if the demand for high-risk loans exceeds their supply by the
mixed-portfolio banks, which is …xed by the condition that the share of low-risk
loans in their portfolio is 1 ¡®lev, implying that the total amount of loans that
they grant is nL (rL) = (1 ¡ ®lev), and further that the number of high-risk loans
that they grant is (®lev= (1 ¡ ®lev))nL (rL). Hence, the considered strategies
are possible if
nH (¹rH) ¸ ®lev1¡®lev nL (rL;E (¹rH ; klev; ®lev))
This is equivalent with
®lev · f1 (klev) (29)
where the function f1 is given by
f1 (klev) =
nH (¹rH)
nH (¹rH) + nL (rL;E (¹rH ; klev; ®lev))
(30)
The condition (29) has a simple intuitive interpretation. The value f1 (klev)
is the share of high-risk loans among all the granted loans in the loan market
when the banks follow the strategies that we just described, and the condition
states this share is larger than or equal with the share of high-risk loans in the
portfolios of the mixed-portfolio banks. This statement must, obviously, be valid
if the only banks that there are on the market in addition to the mixed-portfolio
banks are high-risk loan banks which specialize in high-risk loans.
We now wish to demonstrate that when (29) is valid, the strategies that we
have just described constitute an equilibrium of the model. The assumption
(27) immediately implies that in the considered case both the high-risk banks
and the banks with the mixed portfolio have zero value. It remains to be shown
that there is no other strategy choice for the banks that would yield a positive
value for the bank, i.e., that a bank which chooses a loan portfolio with a share
® of high-risk projects for which ® 6= ®lev and ® 6= 1, cannot have a positive
value.
Beginning with the case in which ®lev < ® < 1, it is observed that for a
bank with the portfolio ® the only binding constraint is the risk-based capital
requirement. In this case Lemma 1 immediately implies that the value of the
bank with portfolio ® cannot be positive.
Consider now a bank with the portfolio ®, where 0 · ® < ®lev. For this
portfolio, the only binding constraint is the leverage ratio requirement. In the
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analysis of this case, it turns out to be practical to depart from our earlier
practice of considering banks of a unit size, and to consider a bank which has
a unit of amount of low-risk loans in its portfolio. Clearly, a bank of this kind
will have a share ® of high-risk loans in its portfolio if the number of high-risk
loans that it possesses is given by ®= (1 ¡ ®). The size of the bank must be
1 + ®1¡® =
1
1¡®
and - given that the leverage ratio requirement is a binding constraint for it -
its amount of capital must be given by klev= (1 ¡ ®).
We shall denote the value of a bank of this kind by VLH (®). Clearly, VLH (®)
and the value V (k;®k; rL; ¹rH) of the corresponding bank of a unit size are
related by
VLH (®) =
1
1 ¡ ®V (klev ; ®; rL; ¹rH) (31)
The following lemma characterizes the dependence of VLH (®) on ®.
Lemma 3. If (25) is valid and rL is given by (28), it must be the case that
@VLH(®)
@® > 0.
Hence, whenever (29) and the equilibrium conditions (27) are valid, the
value VLH (®) of a mixed-portfolio bank is negative whenever ® < ®lev, from
which one may, of course conclude that also the value V (klev ; ®; rL; ¹rH) of the
corresponding bank with unit size is negative. In other words, whenever the
banks are able to choose the strategies that we just described, choosing them
will constitute an equilibrium. We summarize the results that we have obtained
so far as the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Whenever the leverage ratio requirement klev lies in the range
in which (29) is valid, there is an equilibrium in which there are high-risk banks
specializing in high-risk loans only, and mixed-portfolio banks with the portfolio
®lev. The result (28) characterizes the interest rates as a function of klev for
these equilibria.
It is also easy to characterize the comparative statics of the equilibrium
that we have just found. Just like before the symbols ¹rL and ¹rH refer to the
equilibrium interest rates in the absence of the leverage ratio requirements, and
the demands for loans that correspond to these interest rates are denoted by
¹nL = nL (¹rL) and ¹nH = nH (¹rH).
Theorem 2. The following statements are valid when the values of klev lies
in the range in which in which (29) is valid:
a) The high-risk interest rate rH and the demand for high-risk loans nH are
constants, and have the values ¹rH and ¹nH that they would have in the absence of
the leverage ratio requirement. However, the number of high-risk loans …nanced
by the specialized high-risk loan banks is decreased.
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b) The low-risk interest rate rL satis…es rL ¸ ¹rL, implying that the demand
for low-risk loans nL satis…es nL · ¹nL. The low-risk interest rate rL is a non-
decreasing function of klev, implying that nL is a non-increasing function of
klev.
c) The share of high-risk loans among all granted loans is larger than or
equal with their share in the absence of the leverage ratio requirement, and a
non-decreasing function of klev .
6. The Symmetric Equilibrium with Mixed-portfolio
Banks
We now investigate the circumstances under which the model has a symmetric
equilibrium in which all the banks have the mixed portfolio ®lev. The results
of the previous section indicate that an equilibrium of this kind exists at least
when
f1 (klev) = ®lev
As already explained, in this case the model has an equilibrium in which high-
risk interest rate rH has the value ¹rH that it would have in the absence of
the leverage ratio requirement, and the banks …nancing low-risk loans react to
the leverage ratio requirement by including high-risk loans in their portfolio.
However, if f1 (klev) = ®lev, the mixed-portfolio banks will end up …nancing all
the high-risk projects, and no high-risk projects are left over to the specialized
high-risk banks.
When
®lev > f1 (klev)
the kind of equilibrium that we considered in the previous section is not possible:
if it is the case that ®lev > f1 (klev), that rH = ¹rH , and that the banks follow the
strategies that we just described, the mixed-portfolio banks will run out of high-
risk loans. Intuitively, one may expect that such excess supply of high-risk loans
would reduce the interest rates on high-risk loans, and this may be expected to
increase the interest rates on low-risk loans (because the reduction in ¹rH makes
the mixed portfolio less attractive). Each of these e¤ects tends to increase the
share of high-risk loans in the market, and a symmetric equilibrium should
be possible if the two interest rates shift to an extent which yields the value
®lev for the share of high-risk loans in the loan market. More speci…cally, one
would expect that a symmetric equilibrium should be possible when a moderate
increase in rL su¢ces to produce the value ®lev for the share of high-risk loans;
if, however, the necessary raise in rL is so large that it makes the specialization
to low-risk loans preferable to a mixed portfolio, the considered equilibrium will
not be possible.
Next we shall investigate rigorously the kind of equilibria to which the above
intuitive explanation applies, and we shall begin by giving a rigorous formulation
to the last of the points that were made above. We recall that rL;lev denotes
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the low-risk interest rate when there are specialized low-risk banks, and that
rL;E (¹rH ; klev; ®lev) denotes the low-risk interest rate in the equilibium that was
considered in the previous section. One may conclude from Lemma 3 that
rL;lev > rL;E (¹rH ; klev ; ®lev) (32)
(because if it were the case that rL;lev · rL;E (¹rH ; klev ; ®lev), the interest rate
rL;E (¹rH ; klev; ®lev) would be su¢cient to yield a non-negative value for the
specialized low-risk bank, contradicting Lemma 3).
It is clear that a symmetric equilibrium cannot exist if the low-risk interest
rate would have to raise above rL;lev before the share of high-risk projects could
be ®lev (because in this situation the strategy of specializing to low-risk projects
would be preferable to the mixed-portfolio strategy that we just described). If
the low-risk interest rate was rL;lev and the high-risk interest rate had the value
rH;E (rL;lev ; klev; ®lev) that corresponds to rL;lev in equilibrium, the share of
high-risk loans in the whole loan market would be
f2 (klev) =
nH (rH;E (rL;lev; klev ; ®lev))
nH (rH;E (rL;lev; klev; ®lev)) + nL (rL;lev)
(33)
If f2 (klev) < ®lev, even the interest rate rL;lev is too low to yield the
symmetric equilibrium that we considered above. As our next step, we present
the result that the symmetric equilibrium exists whenever
f1 (klev) < ®lev < f2 (klev) (34)
Theorem 3. If (34) is valid, the model has a symmetric equilibrium in
which each bank has the portfolio ®lev.
It should be observed that, given that the demands nL and nH are decreasing
functions of the interest rates, one may conclude from (32), (30), and (33) that
f1 (k) < f2 (k) (35)
When klev ranges from kL to kH , the value of ®lev = (klev ¡ kL) = (kH ¡ kL)
ranges from 0 to 1 but the values of f1 and f2 stay positive and smaller than 1.
Hence, one may now conclude that there must be values of klev between kL and
kH for which ®lev is between f1 (klev) and f2 (klev), i.e. for which (34) is valid.
If all banks have the same portfolio ®lev in an equilibrium, the number ®lev
must be equal with the share of high-risk loans in the whole market. Hence in
this case the interest rates rL and rH must be such that
®lev =
nH(rH)
nH(rH)+nL(rL)
Together with the fact that the high-risk interest rate is a decreasing function
of the low-risk interest rate, this leads to the following results concerning the
comparative statics of the symmetric equilibrium.14
14Observe that although the following theorem states that rH is below ¹rH in the whole
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Theorem 4. The following statements are valid when the values of klev lies
in the range in which in which (34) is valid:
a) The high-risk interest rate is smaller and the demand for high-risk loans
is larger than in the absence of the leverage ratio requirement.
b) The low-risk interest rate is larger and the demand for low-risk loans is
smaller than in the absence of the leverage ratio requirement. The low-risk
interest rate is an increasing function of klev.
c) The share ® of high-risk loans is equal with ®lev, which is smaller than
their share in the absence of the leverage ratio requirement, and an increasing
function of klev.
7. The Equilibrium with Low-risk Loan Banks
and Mixed-portfolio Banks
For reasons that were explained in Section 3, we have restricted attention to the
equilibria in which each bank has one of the portfolios 0, ®lev, and 1. Among
such equilibria, there is just one that we have not yet considered, i.e. the equi-
librium in which there are specialized low-risk loan banks and mixed-portfolio
banks with the portfolio ®lev. Analogously with the equilibria of Section 5, the
equilibrium conditions for the two kinds of banks may in this case be formulated
as ½
VL (klev; rL) = 0
V (klev ; ®lev; rL; rH) = 0
(36)
Clearly, these conditions su¢ce to determine the interest rates rL and rH , and
they are solved by ½
rL = rL;lev
rH = rH;E (rL;lev; klev; ®lev)
(37)
In order to understand intuitively the nature of the equilibria to which (36)
and (37) apply, it is helpful to think of a situation in which the value of klev is
only slightly smaller than kH . For such values the model has an equilibrium in
which there are two kinds of banks. Some banks …nance low-risk projects only,
and for these banks the leverage ratio requirement is the binding constraint, and
the interest rate with which these banks are faced by rL;lev. As it was explained
above, the increase in the required amount of capital tends to decrease the value
of the banks, and accordingly,
range in which (34) is valid, it does not state that rH is locally a decreasing function of klev
for all values of klev in this range. This is because an increase in klev increases the capital
costs of the symmetric equlibrium bank, and there seems to be no easy way of proving that
rL and rH cannot both increase when klev is increased. (However, if they did, the increase in
rL would have to be su¢ciently large to make the share of high-risk loans among all …nanced
loans increase.)
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@rL;lev
@k
> 0 (38)
All the high-risk projects are …nanced by the other group of banks, but they
…nance also some low-risk projects. Their motives for having a mixed portfolio
can be understood intuitively as follows. If a bank which …nances high-risk loans
adds some low-risk loans to its portfolio, the amount of capital that it needs
for …nancing them is not klev per loan, but kL per loan because the leverage
ratio requirement is not a binding constraint for it. However, the interest rate
for low-risk projects has risen to the value which corresponds to klev and which
according to (38) must be larger than the value that corresponds to kL. Hence,
adding low-risk projects to the portfolio will be pro…table for the bank until
the leverage ratio requirement has become a binding constraint for it, i.e. until
the share of high-risk projects has sunk to ®lev.15 However, when the banking
sector is competitive, the practice of including low-risk loans in the portfolios of
the banks …nancing high-risk loans tends to lower the interest rates for high-risk
loans.
Since the mixed-portfolio banks …nance all the high-risk loans in the cur-
rently considered situation, the stategies that we just described are possible if
the mixed-portfolio banks do not run out of low-risk loans. The mixed-portfolio
bank needs (1 ¡ ®lev) =®lev low-risk loans for each high-risk loan that it …nances
and, hence, the strategies are possible if and only if
nL (rL;lev) ¸ ((1 ¡ ®lev) =®lev)nH (rH;E (rL;lev ; klev; ®lev))
Using the de…nition (33), this is seen to be equivalent with
®lev ¸ f2 (klev) (39)
According to our next theorem, the the currently considered equilibrium exists
whenever (39) is valid.
Theorem 5. In the range in which (39) is valid, there is an equilibrium
in which there are low-risk loan banks specializing in low-risk loans only, and
mixed-portfolio banks with the portfolio ®lev . In this equilibrium the interest
rates are given by (37).
The following theorem summarizes the basic facts concerning the compara-
tive statics of the currently considered equilibrium. The statement that we make
concerning the share of the high-risk loans ((d) below) is quite weak. It seems
that a more interesting statement would require some restrictive assumptions
on the demand functions nL and nH of the two types of loans.
Theorem 6. The following statements are valid when the values of klev lies in
the range in which in which (39) is valid:
15More precisely, this will be the case provided that the increased low-risk interest rate
a¤ects the pro…ts of the bank more strongly than the negative e¤ects from a mixed portfolio,
but as it was explained in Section 4, the latter e¤ect should be small in a realistically calibrated
version of the model.
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(a) The interest rate for high-risk loans rH is lower and the demand for them
is higher than in the absence of the leverage ratio requirement.
(b) The interest rate for low-risk loans rL is higher and the demand for them
is lower than in the absence of the leverage ratio requirement.
(c) Both interest rates are increasing, and both demands are decreasing
fuctions of klev.
(d) The share ® of high-risk loans among all granted loans is larger than
their share in the absence of the leverage ratio requirement.
8. Concluding Remarks
We have shown that the introduction of the leverage ratio requirement, when
it interacts with the risk-based IRB capital requirements, might lead to less
lending to low-risk customers and to increased lending to high-risk customers.
If such allocational e¤ects are counter-productive to …nancial stability, then they
may pose a trade-o¤ against the alleged positive …nancial stability e¤ects of the
leverage ratio requirement.
Our results are based on a theoretical model and are hence qualitative in
nature. A natural extension would be to provide numerical examples with the
calibrated model of changes in loan prices and quantities after the introduction
of a leverage ratio requirement. Another potential extension would be to ana-
lyze the trade-o¤ between the potentially negative allocational e¤ects and the
positive …nancial stability e¤ects of the the leverage ratio requirement. In order
to do this, one would have to 1) provide a model for why less low-risk lending
and more high-risk lending might be socially undesirable, and to 2) model one
(or some) of the alleged positive …nancial stability e¤ects of the leverage ratio
requirement.
Appendix. Proofs of Theorems and Lemmata
Proof of Lemma 1. By elementary algebra, it is seen that ®2 may be
expressed in the form
®2 =
®3¡®2
®3¡®1®1 +
®2¡®1
®3¡®1®3 = ¯®1 + (1 ¡ ¯)®3
We may now conclude from (2)that
· (®2) = ¯· (®1) + (1 ¡ ¯)· (®3)
and from (7) that
½ (®2; rL; rH ; z) = ¯½ (®1; rL; rH ; z) + (1 ¡ ¯) ½ (®2; rL; rH ; z)
Hence, one may conclude from (8) and (9) that
¦(k;®2; rL; rH) =
R bz®
¡1
¡
· (®2) + ½ (®2; rL; rH ; z) ¹R
¢
d©(z)
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=
R 1
¡1 min
©
0; ¯
¡
· (®1) + ½ (®1; rL; rH ; z) ¹R
¢
+(1 ¡ ¯) ¡· (®3) + ½ (®3; rL; rH ; z) ¹R¢ª d©(z)
· ¯ R 1¡1 min©0; · (®1) + ½ (®1; rL; rH ; z) ¹Rª d©(z)
+ (1 ¡ ¯)min©0; · (®3) + ½ (®3; rL; rH ; z) ¹Rªd©(z)
= ¯¦(· (®1) ; ®1; rL; rH) + (1 ¡ ¯)¦ (· (®3) ; ®3; rL; rH)
and from (10) that
V (· (®2) ; ®2; rL; rH) = ¡· (®2) + 11+±¦(· (®2) ; ®2; rL; rH)
· ¯
³
¡· (®1) + 11+±¦(· (®1) ; ®1; rL; rH)
´
+(1 ¡ ¯)
³
¡· (®3) + 11+±¦(· (®3) ; ®3; rL; rH)
´
= ¯V (· (®1) ; ®1; rL; rH) + (1 ¡ ¯)V (· (®3) ; ®3; rL; rH).
Proof of Lemma 2. Lemma 2 follows from Lemma 1 by putting
kL = kH = k.
Proof of Lemma 3. Combining (31) with (7)-(10), it is observed that
VLH (®) = ¡ klev
1 ¡ ®+
1
1 + ±
Z bz®
¡1
µ
klev
1 ¡ ® + ½L (z; rL)
¹R+
®
1 ¡ ®½H (z; ¹rH)
¹R
¶
d©(z)
(40)
Remembering that
klev = (1 ¡ ®lev) kL + ®levkH ,
the amount of capital of the considered bank, klev= (1 ¡ ®), may be expressed
in the form
klev
1¡® = kL +
®
1¡®kH +
³
klev
1¡® ¡ kL ¡ ®1¡®kH
´
= kL + ®1¡®kH +
®lev¡®
1¡® (kH ¡ kL)
Applying this result to (40), one may conclude that
VLH (®) = ¡kL + 11+±
R bz®
¡1
¡
kL + ½L (z; rL) ¹R
¢
d©(z)
¡ ®1¡®kH + 11+±
³
®
1¡®
´R bz®
¡1
¡
kH + ½H (z; ¹rH) ¹R
¢
d©(z)
¡®lev¡®1¡® (kH ¡ kL) + 11+± ®lev¡®1¡®
R bz®
¡1 (kH ¡ kL) d©(z)
According to the equilibrium conditions (15) which are valid in the absence of
the leverage ratio requirement, the interest rates ¹rL and ¹rH satisfy the conditions
VL (kL; ¹rL) = ¡kL + 11+±
R bzL
¡1
¡
kL + ½L (z; rL) ¹R
¢
d©(z) = 0
and
VH (kH ; ¹rH) = ¡kH + 11+±
R bzH
¡1
¡
kH + ½H (z; ¹rH) ¹R
¢
d©(z) = 0
This allows us to conclude that
VLH (®) = VLH (®) ¡ VL (kL; ¹rL) ¡ ®1¡®VH (kH ; ¹rH)
= 1
1+±
R bzL
¡1 (½L (z; rL) ¡ ½L (z; ¹rL)) ¹Rd©(z)
+ 11+±
R bz®bzL ¡kL + ½L (z; rL) ¹R¢ d©(z)
+ ®1¡®
³
1
1+±
´³R bz®bzH ¡kH + ½H (z; ¹rH) ¹R¢ d©(z)´
¡®lev¡®1¡® (kH ¡ kL)
³
1 ¡ 11+±©(bz®)´
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Forming the derivative of VLH (®) with respect to ®, it is observed that alsobz® depends on ®, but this dependence does not a¤ect the value of @VLH=@®,
because
@VLH
@bz® = '(bz®)1+±
³
kL + ½L (bz®; rL) ¹R+ ®1¡® ¡kH + ½H (bz®; ¹rH) ¹R¢ + ®lev¡®1¡® (kH ¡ kL)´
= '(bz®)1+±
³
klev + ½L (bz®; rL) ¹R+ ®1¡®½H (bz®; ¹rH) ¹R´
and the number in parantheses is the pro…t of the bank when z = bz®, and
according to the de…nition of bz® this pro…t equals zero. Hence,
@VLH
@bz® = 0
Since
@
@®
³
®
1¡®
´
= 1
(1¡®)2 and
@
@®
³
®lev¡®
1¡®
´
= ¡ 1¡®lev
(1¡®)2
we may now conclude that
@VLH
@® =
1
(1¡®)2(1+±)
³R bz®bzH ¡kH + ½H (z; ¹rH) ¹R¢ d©(z)´
+1¡®lev
(1¡®)2 (kH ¡ kL)
³
1 ¡ 11+±©(bz®)´
Let ¹® denote the share of high-risk loans among all granted loans. Given that
there are also banks which specialize in high-risk loans, it must be the case that
®lev · ¹®, and - remembering that ©(bz®) < 1 - we may conclude that
(1 + ±) (1 ¡ ®)2 (@VLH=@®)
>
³R bz®bzH ¡kH + ½H (z; ¹rH) ¹R¢ d©(z)´ + (1 ¡ ¹®) ± (kH ¡ kL) (41)
Next, we observe that the currently considered mixed portfolio bank cannot
fail for those values of z for which neither a high-risk loan bank nor a low-risk
bank would fail in the absence of the leverage ratio requirement, and hence,bz® ¸ min fbzL; bzHg. We now consider separately the cases in which bz® ¸ bzH andbzL · bz® < bzH .
Beginning with the case in which bzH · bz®, it is observed that the integral in
the above formula will be negative in this case, since in this case the the values
of z between bzH and bz® correspond to cases in which a high-risk project bank
would fail in the absence of the leverage ratio requirement. In this case we use
(11) to arrive at the approximation
(1 + ±) (1 ¡ ®)2 (@VLH=@®) >
infz (kH + ½H (z; ¹rH)) (1 ¡ ©(bzH)) + ± (1 ¡ ¹®) (kH ¡ kL)
= ± (1 ¡ ¹®) (bH ¡ bL) ¹R¡ (¸ ¡ bH) (1 ¡ ©(bzH)) ¹R
This number is positive whenever (25) is valid .
However, it is also conceivable to that bzL · bz® < bzH . Intuitively, in this case
the capital requirement for high-risk projects is so high that a bank …nancing
only them has a smaller failure probability than a bank …nancing only low-risk
projects. In this case the integrand in (41) will be positive but the integral is
nevertheless negative because its lower bound is larger than its upper bound,
and using (11) we arrive at the approximation
(1 + ±) (1 ¡ ®)2 (@VLH=@®)
> ± (1 ¡ ¹®) (kH ¡ kL) ¡ supz
©
kH + ½H (z; ¹rH) ¹R
ª
(1 ¡ ©(bzL))
= ± (1 ¡ ¹®) (bH ¡ bL) ¹R¡ (bH + rH) (1 ¡ ©(bzL)) ¹R
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Also this number is positive when the assumption (25) is valid and we can now
conclude that in either case,
@VLH
@® > 0.
This completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. Part (a) of this theorem follows from the de…nition of
the considered equilibrium, and (c) is a trivial consequence of (a) and (b). Hence,
it su¢ces to prove (b). Given that the low-risk interest rate rL is determined
by the equilibrium condition
V (klev; ®lev; rL; ¹rH) = 0,
it is not, in general, independent of klev. To see why rL cannot decrease as a
function of klev, let k1 and k2, k1 < k2, be two values of klev for which (29) is
valid. If rL1 and rL2 are the low-risk interest rates that correspond to k1 and
k2, and if the values of ®lev which correspond to klev = k1 and klev = k2 in
accordance with (20)are denoted by to ®1 and ®2, it must be the case that
V (k1; ®1; rL1; ¹rH) = 0,
and - since also the high-risk banks have zero value in equilibrium-
V (kH ; 1; rL1; ¹rH) = 0,
and one may conclude from Lemma 1 that
V (k2; ®2; rL1; ¹rH) · 0.
Now it cannot be the case that rL2 < rL1 because V is an increasing function
of rL, and if it were the case that rL2 < rL1, one could conclude that
V (k2; ®2; rL2; ¹rH) < V (k2; ®2; rL1; ¹rH) · 0.
Proof of Theorem 3. Assume that
f1 (klev) · ®lev · f2 (klev) (42)
and de…ne rH2 by rH2 = rH;E (rL;lev ; klev; ®lev). Clearly, the de…nitions (23)
and (24) of the functions rH;E and rL;E imply that
rL;lev = rL;E (rH2; klev; ®lev)
so that the condition (42) may be put into the form
g (¹rH) · ®lev · g (¹rH2) (43)
where the function g is de…ned by
g (rH) =
nH(rH)
nH(rH)+nL(rL;E(rH ;klev ;®lev))
One can now conclude from (3) and the fact that rL;E is a decreasing and
continuous function that g is an decreasing and continuous function of rH . Hence
there must be a value of rH between rH2 and ¹rH for which
g (rH) = ®lev (44)
Consider now the case in which the high-risk interest rate has the value de…ned
by (44), and the low-risk interest rate is
rL = rL;E (rH ; klev; ®lev)
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i.e. the low-risk interest rate has the value which makes the equilibrium condi-
tion (22) valid for rH . Now the equilibrium condition (22) is by construction
valid for the given rH and rL, and according to (44) also the supply of loans by
the banks matches their demand if all the banks have the portfolio ®lev. In ad-
dition, the interest rate for high-risk loans is lower that ¹rH , which is the interest
rate that would be needed for giving the specialized high-risk loan banks a non-
negative value, and the interest rate for low-risk loans is lower than rL;lev , i.e
the interest rate which would be needed for giving the specialized low-risk loan
banks a non-negative value. Hence the considered situation is an equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 4. The part (c) of this theorem follows immediately
from the de…nition of the considered equilibrium. It was demonstrated within
the proof of Theorem 3 that rH · ¹rH , which implies that
rL ¸ rL;E (¹rH ; klev; ®lev) > ¹rL
In other words, the high-risk interest rate is lower and low-risk interest rate is
higher than in the absence of the leverage ratio requirement. It still should be
proved that the low-risk interest rate is an increasing function of klev.
To see this, consider two values klev = k1 and klev = k2 of klev for which the
symmetric equilibrium exists, and for which k1 < k2. At least one of the two
interest rates rL and rH must be larger when klev = k2 than when klev = k1
because the mixed portfolio banks are subject to a larger capital requirement
when klev = k2. It is now observed that it cannot be the case that rL does not
increase but rH increases if the leverage ratio requirement shifts from klev = k1
to klev = k2 , because in this case also the market share of high-risk projects
would have to decrease. Hence, the low-risk interest rate is an increasing func-
tion of klev.
Proof of Theorem 5. We have already shown that the strategies of the two
kinds banks are possible whenever (39) is valid. The condition (36) immediately
implies that the loan portfolios of the two kinds of banks, i.e. the portfolio ® = 0
and the portfolio ® = ®lev, correspond to banks with zero value. It remains to
be shown that none of the other loan portfolios, i.e. a portfolio ® for which
either 0 < ® < ®lev or ®lev < ® · 1, can lead to a positive value of the bank
in the considered case. To see this, it is …rst observed that if a bank had a
portfolio ® for which 0 < ® < ®lev, for it the only binding constraint would
be the leverage ratio constraint, and one could conclude by applying Lemma 2
with ®1 = 0 and ®3 = ®lev that the value of the bank was at most zero.
Our proof that none of the portfolios ® for which ®lev < ® · 1 corresponds
to a bank with a positive value will be based on a more general result which is
concerned with the dependence of the equilibrium interest rate rH on the size of
the of leverage ratio requirement in the region in which the currently considered
strategies are possible. We wish to show that in this region
drH
dklev
> 0
To show this, consider now the behaviour of the high-risk interest rate rH ,
which is determined by the condition
V (klev ; ®lev; rL;lev; rH)
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= ¡klev+ 11+±
R bzlev
¡1
¡
klev + (1 ¡ ®lev) ½L (z; rL;lev) ¹R+ ®lev½H (z; rH) ¹R
¢
d©(z)
= 0
in which bzlev is the value of z for which the integrand is zero.
Below it turns out to be practical not to consider a bank of the unit size,
but a bank which has a unit amount of high-risk loans in its loan portfolio. For
a bank of this kind, the share of high-risk loans among all the granted loans
will be ®lev if the size of the bank is 1=®lev, and in this case the bank has
(1 ¡ ®lev) =®lev low-risk loans. We shall denote the value of a bank of this kind
by VHL (klev; rH). It is clear that VHL (klev; rH) must satisfy
VHL (klev; rH) =
1
®lev
V (klev; ®lev; rL:lev; rH) (45)
This is equivalent with
VHL (klev; rH)
= ¡ klev®lev + 11+±
R bzlev
¡1
³
klev
®lev
+ 1¡®lev®lev ½L (z; rL;lev)
¹R+ ½H (z; rH) ¹R
´
d©(z)
On the other hand, the value of the low-risk loan bank is given by
VL (klev ; rL;lev) = ¡klev + 11+±
R bzL;lev
¡1
¡
klev + ½L (z; rL;lev) ¹R
¢
d©(z) = 0
where bzL;lev is the value of z for which the integrand is zero. Combining the las
two results one gets
VHL (klev; rH) = VHL (klev; rH) ¡ 1¡®lev®lev VL (klev ; rL;lev)
= 11+±
³
1¡®lev
®lev
´ R bzlevbzL;lev ¡klev + ½L (z; rL;lev) ¹R¢ d©(z)
¡klev + 11+±
R bzlev
¡1
¡
klev + ½H (z; rH) ¹R
¢
d©(z)
The mixed-strategy bank and the low-risk loan bank have the same amount
of capital per loan althhough the loans of the mixed-strategy bank are partially
riskier, and hence, the failure probability of the mixed-strategy bank is larger,
so that
bzlev < bzL;lev (46)
According to (20),
1¡®lev
®lev
= kH¡klevklev¡kL
Hence, the value of VHL can more naturally be expressed in the form
VHL (klev; rH) = ¡
³
kH¡klev
klev¡kL
´³
1
1+±
´ R bzL;levbzlev ¡klev + ½L (z; rL;lev) ¹R¢ d©(z)
¡klev + 11+±
R bzlev
¡1
¡
klev + ½H (z; rH) ¹R
¢
d©(z)
As the next step, we form an estimate the partial derivative of VHL with respect
to klev. Remembering (46), we conclude that
@
@klev
VHL (klev; rH)
< kH¡kL
(klev¡kL)2
³
1
1+±
´ R bzL;levbzlev ¡klev + ½L (z; rL;lev) ¹R¢ d©(z)
¡
³
1 ¡ 1
1+±©(bzlev)´
Since bzlev < bzL;lev, the values of z in the integrand are values for which a
low-risk loan bank with capital klev does not fail, and we now arrive at the
approximation
26
@
@klev
VHL (klev ; rH)
< ¡ ±1+± + kH¡kL(klev¡kL)2
³
1
1+±
´¡
klev + rL;lev ¹R
¢
(© (bzL;lev) ¡ ©(bzlev))
Here klev < kH and rL;lev < ¹rH . We observe that
©(bzlev) > min f©(bzL) ;©(bzH)g,
Since ®lev is given by (20), one may also conclude that
@
@klev
VHL (klev; rH)
< 11+±
³
¡± + 1®2lev
bH+rH
bH¡bL max f1 ¡ ©(bzL) ; 1 ¡ ©(bzH)g´
Since banks that do not have the portfolio ®lev are specializing in low-risk loans,
the value ®lev must be at least as large as the share ¹® of the high-risk projects
among all …nanced projects. Hence, the above condition is valid at least when
max f1 ¡ ©(bzL) ; 1 ¡ ©(bzH)g < ±¹®2 bH¡bLbH+rH
i.e. when the assumption (26) is valid. In other words, the condition (26) implies
that
@
@klev
VHL (klev; rH) < 0
On the other hand,
@
@rH
VHL (klev; rH) > 0
and when the equilibrium interest rate rH is viewed as a function rH (klev) of
klev, it must satisfy
0 = dVHL(klev ;rH(klev))dklev =
@
@klev
VHL (klev; rH) +
drH
dklev
@
@rH
VHL (klev ; rH)
and this can only be the case if
drH
dklev
> 0 (47)
In the limit in which klev approaches kH the equilibrium of the model ap-
proaches the equilibrium of a model with the ‡at-rate capital requirement kH .
Hence, in this limit rH must approach ¹rH , and we may now conclude from (47)
that in the situation which is considered in this section
rH < ¹rH (48)
We now conclude the pro…le 1 - i.e. the pro…le of specialized high-risk loan bank
- must correspond to a bank with a negative value in the currently conisdered
situation. Utilizing Lemma 1, we further conclude that each pro…le ® for which
®lev < ® · 1 corresponds to a bank with a negative value. This completes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 6. The claims concerning low-risk interest rates are
trivial consequences of the fact that the amount of capital of a specialized low-
risk bank larger than the amount of capital kL in the absence of the leverage
ratio requirement, and equal with klev. The facts that rH < ¹rH and that rH is
an increasing function of klev have already been presented as results (48) and
(47) within the proof of Theorem 5. Finally, the statement (d) follows trivially
from (a) and (b).
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